sought to bring to a higher level of public debate than the tabloid press to the question of "what it is like to live under more than one (legal) jurisdiction" and how (and how far) the civil law of the land should recognise or accommodate a legal pluralism based on religious adherence.
Part -perhaps much -of the public outcry which greeted the Archbishop"s lecture in 2008 reflected a lack of knowledge of how religious courts already operate in this country. Mediahyped fears over the operation of shariah courts were matched with prejudiced comments about the privileging of Jewish courts which have indeed operated in this country for over a hundred years. And no one mentioned that the Roman Catholic Church has handed down decrees of nullity of marriage throughout its history. So our project explores how religious law already functions alongside civil law in England and Wales. The simple aim of our study was:
"to collect information on the role and practice of religious courts in England and Wales in order to contribute to debate concerning the extent to which English law should accommodate religious legal systems".
Our more detailed objectives were to: 
Introduction
Part one of this Commentary falls into four sections. The first section provides a general overview of how English law regulates religion. The second section discusses how religious law is recognised under English law whilst the third section focuses upon the recognition of religious family law, the object of our study. The fourth section examines how religious courts are recognised under English law, with particular reference to the Arbitration Act 1996.
The Regulation of Religion in England and Wales
Unlike many European countries, 2 English law does not include detailed registration schemes for religious groups. However, this does not mean that religion is not regulated. Although registration is not compulsory under English law, a multitude of overlapping laws have been enacted to recognise and regulate both religious groups and religious individuals enabling them to benefit from legal and fiscal advantages.
Religious Groups
The constitutional position of religion differs in the divergent nations of the United Kingdom. 3 Formerly in all four nations there were established churches. However, legislation disestablishing the national church has been enacted in respect of Ireland and Wales. 4 There are two different established churches in England and Scotland respectively:
the Church of England is an Episcopal Anglican Church; the Church of Scotland is
Presbyterian.
This commentary focuses upon the law of England and Wales. It will focus upon the legal status of religious groups other than the Church of England. Regardless of registration status, all religious groups are usually treated as voluntary associations. 13 The relationship of members as between themselves is governed by quasicontract and the organisations are treated as a matter of law as members of clubs or unincorporated associations. These exist where two or more people are voluntarily bound together for common purposes and undertake mutual duties and obligations. Unincorporated associations have no legal personality distinct from their members (unlike a corporation):
they cannot sue or be sued and cannot hold property (though institutions within them may be legal owners of property if they have the status of corporations or trustees). Religious voluntary associations seeking legal personality can form as a limited company. 15 , members "may adopt rules for enforcing discipline within their body which will be binding on those who, expressly or by implication, have assented to them." It is also often understood that these rules and structures are also binding on the association itself. 16 
Religious Individuals
With respect to religious individuals, the traditional legal position has been that everyone has the right to do whatever they like unless restrained by the law. 17 Religious laws and practices are free to operate where the law of the State is silent. This "negative" protection of religious freedom has been bolstered in recent years by a number of laws giving "positive" legal rights, most notably the Human Rights Act 1998 and new laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. The Human Rights Act 1998 gave effect in domestic law to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Convention rights (including freedom of religion under Article 9) are now part of domestic law, enforceable in domestic courts. 18 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) painstaking examination of questions of doctrine, theology and ecclesiology combining an assessment of history and a full understanding of contemporary and emergent theology and ecumenism". 24 This discernible reticence on the part of the English courts to become involved in adjudicating disputes within churches may be elevated to a principle of non-interference. In 25 Eady J held that "the well-known principle of English law to the effect that the courts will not attempt to rule upon doctrinal issues or intervene in the regulation or governance of religious groups" constituted a self-denying ordinance, applied as a matter of public policy". 26 He held that "such disputes as arise between the followers of any given religious faith are often likely to involve doctrines or beliefs which do not readily lend themselves to the sort of resolution which is the normal function of a judicial tribunal". Eady J was by no means the first judge to recognise this principle. As Simon Brown J stated in 1992, courts are "hardly in a position to regulate" religious functions: "The court must inevitably be wary of entering so self-evidently 19 For analysis see R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 5. 20 For analysis see ibid chapter 6. 21 For discussion of the usefulness of the term "religious law" see ibid chapter 9 and the essays in A Huxley (ed) Religion, Law 
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The Recognition of Religious Family Law in England and Wales
This section focuses upon the recognition of religious family law by State law in England and
Wales. This merits separate discussion given that our research focuses upon the marriage and divorce jurisdiction of the three institutions studied.
42
Marriage
Religious jurisdiction over family matters has some limited recognition in the civil law of England and Wales. Indeed, at common law, the basic validity of a marriage was satisfied by 38 R Hammond-Sharlot and P Booth, "Islamic Law in the UK" (2008) Family Law 362. See also the provisions of the Finance Act 2007. 39 The term "international law" is often used to describe systems of law which govern the relationship between States, such as the legal instruments of the United Nations. However, technically this is known as "public international Law". And this is compared with "private international law" which is the part of the national law of a country that establishes rules for dealing with cases involving the laws of other countries, foreign law. "Private international law" is also known as conflict of laws. 40 the Church, or…their baptism in Christ", from "a willingness to be bound to it because of shared faith…in foro conscientiae": "its binding effect does not come from the availability of the secular sanctions of State courts of law"; "the availability of these latter sanctions when spiritual matters become mixed with property matters is an incident of the consensual compact or contract"; so: "where property is involved the consensual compact or contract is given the same effect, in relation to property matters, as if it were a common law contract, but does not in any way alter the primary basis of that compact or contract". The doctrine of "consensual compact" means that the rules and structures of voluntary associations are binding on assenting members and the courts of the State will exceptionally intervene to enforce the laws of a religious group where there is a financial interest and in relation to the disposal and administration of property.
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The second way in which the decisions of religious courts are recognised is through the Arbitration Act 1996. 59 This, the latest in a long line of similar statutes, provides that people are free to choose to have their disputes arbitrated outside the civil court system but recognised and enforced by the civil courts. 60 The Act focuses not upon courts but upon people. Section 1 provides that "parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest". People can decide how disputes between them are to be resolved and once the parties decide to be bound 57 [1992] by that decision then the secular courts will enforce that decision under the secular law of contract. There are two main limitations upon this, however.
Limitations under the Arbitration Act 1996
The first limitation is as stated in section 1: the secular courts will not enforce a decision where there is "public policy which requires the court not to". 61 An agreement to arbitrate is just like any other contract: it is necessary to show a genuine agreement to arbitrate by both parties. 62 Contracts obtained by duress or those formed with minors or the incapacitated will not be enforced. The agreement to arbitrate must be in writing.
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Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1996 states the general duty of the arbitrator. It must:
(a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined.
An arbitration award that does not comply with this can be set aside by the English court.
64
This also applies where the agreement suffers from a "serious irregularity" such as: exceeding its powers; failure to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties; failure to deal with all the issues that were put to it; and uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award.
65
The importance of this public policy limitation is shown in the Court of Appeal decision in Arbitration also has limited application under family law. Religious courts can grant religious divorces but not legal divorces. Individuals may seek mediation from a religious source but this is a non-binding method of dispute resolution.
74
The Effect of the Arbitration Act 1996
The Arbitration Act 1996 is a facilitative piece of legislation, giving the parties the choice to agree to resolve their disputes outside the courtroom. If an agreement is made to arbitrate a dispute then any other legal proceedings may be stayed. 75 The courts refuse to consider disputes which parties have decided to resolve by arbitration; rather than considering the the question of whether "as a matter of public policy, a particular award… ought not to be enforced and ought, therefore, to be set aside" is "a second and quite separate question" because "an arbitrator"s award, unless set aside, entitles the beneficiary to call upon the executive power of the state to enforce it, and it is the function of the court to see that that executive power is not abused" 70 R Blacklett, " dispute themselves the courts enforce the decision the arbitrator has made. 76 One of the few changes to the law of arbitration made by the 1996 Act 77 was the way in which it "very severely limited the right to apply to appeal from an arbitration award".
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Under the Act, the parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators to form the tribunal and whether there is to be a chairman or umpire. 79 They are also free to decide upon the procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. 80 The parties are free to agree in what circumstances the authority of an arbitrator may be revoked. 81 An arbitrator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith.
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The Arbitration Act 1996 is largely used for commercial purposes and it has many advantages: it is private, cheaper and more flexible than full legal proceedings. 83 It can be used to recognise the decisions of religious courts. 84 Technically, it is not used by religious courts like the Beth Din themselves but is used by individual litigants who decide to take their dispute to a religious court. The key fact about arbitration is that it allows the parties to decide what law the arbitrators will use to decide their dispute. This extends to systems of religious law. Section 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996 enables parties to choose for disputes to be decided "in accordance with other considerations" rather than "in accordance with law". 85 For these purposes "law" has generally been understood to mean the law of the 76 R Blacklett, " 78 The Act was "intended to make successful applications for leave to appeal from an arbitration award very rare indeed": Saville LJ, "The Arbitration Act 1996: What We Have Tried to Accomplish" [1997] Construction Law Review 410, 412. An appeal will only be granted if the court is satisfied that the decision was "obviously wrong", or in relation to a question "of general public importance", that the conclusion was at least "open to serious doubt" and that "despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in the circumstances for the court to determine the question": Arbitration Act 1996, s69(3)(c)-(d Moore-Bick LJ held that the law prohibiting religious discrimination in relation to employment applied to arbitrators because employment was defined as meaning "employment under a contract of service" and the nature of the arbitration was contractual.
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Moreover, the party seeking to enforce the requirement could not rely on the religious exception that permits a person with an "ethos based on religion or belief" to insist that being of a particular religion or belief is an occupational requirement of a job. 94 87 Section 46(2) states that: "For this purpose the choice of laws of a country shall be understood to refer to the substantive laws of the country and not its conflict of laws rules". Religious law could be therefore recognised as "law" rather than "another consideration" if that religious law is a substantive law in a country. See 
Judaism
Like Islam, Judaism is often seen as being a religion of law.
113 According to Neusner and Sonn, the law of Judaism is to be found in "the record of the tradition, written and oral, of
God"s revelation to Moses at Sinai". 114 The written tradition is found in the Hebrew
Scriptures whilst the oral 115 tradition is found in a variety of documents, commentaries, codes and responsa (the replies written by sages in response to questions posed by the faithful).
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There is a long history of courts existing within Judaism. As Neusner and Sonn note, "the law of Judaism provides for three correlated but autonomous institutions to exercise the power to inflict sanctions in the enforcement of the law: God, the court, and the temple". . 115 The word "oral" here (and elsewhere in this commentary) does not mean that these teachings are not now written down. It refers instead to the fact that the teachings did not originate in a "received" holy text. Neusner and Sonn disitisnguih between the "written tradition" in Judaism which they refer to as "the Torah in writing" and the "oral tradition" which they refer to as "the Torah in memory". They note that this "oral" traidtion was "ultimatley preserverd in a variety of documents which reached closure in the first sixcty centuries": J Neusner and T Sonn, Comparing Religions Through Law (Routledge, London 1999) 18-19. 116 The Mishna, a text composed by Juda Ha-Nasr in the second century of Judaism, is the most important book of law after the Torah and has supplied teachers and judges with an authoritative guide to Jewish legal tradition. and producing expert opinion reports on Muslim family law and practice. 145 However the main role of Shariah Councils is that of administering Islamic family law and particularly Islamic divorce. For instance, 95% of correspondence received by the Islamic Sharia Council to date has related to matrimonial problems faced by Muslims in the UK. 146 
Christianity
Unlike the categories, Jewish law and Islamic law, the term "Christian law" is not in regular use. 147 Although the term "canon law" is sometimes employed to provide the Christian equivalent of systems of religious law, 148 the term is often reserved for the Catholic, Anglican and Orthodox churches. Even in that context, the term is problematic, 149 being employed in various ways, some very narrow; 150 some very wide. 151 It is often asserted that other central and coordinating compilation of the Western (or Latin) church and is the primary source of reference for Catholic canon law. 160 The Code outlines specific processes for the resolution of disputes or offences within the community. 161 Regulations for marrying, the conduct of marriage and the prohibition of divorce are outlined with particular specificity. The Church has its own court system. 163 However, the judicial process is treated as a last resort. 164 This is true even once the process has begun: the parties are under a canonical duty to settle amicably, promptly and equitably out of court. 165 The object of a trial is to prosecute or to vindicate the rights of physical or juridical persons, to declare juridical facts or to declare the penalty for offences. 166 Judicial power is exercised by judges or judicial colleges. 167 The courts are ordered hierarchically. 168 The 
The Three Institutions
Having examined the existence of Jewish, Islamic and Catholic courts in the United Kingdom, this section seeks to explore the three selected case studies in further depth, focusing upon their organisational structure.
The Beth Din in London
The formal title of the London Beth Din is the "Beth Din of London and the Country". This denotes the institution"s national role, which has become increasingly important in recent 187 The London Beth Din does the majority of Orthodox conversions in Great Britain. Conversion has to be carried out through a Beth Din. The process is that the applicant studies Judaism for 1-2 years, takes part in formal lessons, is seen at regular periods (every 6 months) by a Dayan, lives within a Jewish family and learns ritual practice. The act of conversion requires circumcision for a male and for both males and females immersion in a ritual bath in the presence of three Dayanim. It has to take place in the presence of the Beth Din and also requires certification by the Beth Din. 188 Jewish status is a fact, to be born of a Jewish mother. The question for this area of the Beth Din"s work is whether the individual in question is Jewish or whether they will require a conversion. Status is important for synagogue membership and marriage. The Beth Din is not now directly involved with Jewish schools given that most admission policies do not hinge upon the question of being Jewish -which is a question of Jewish law. In 191 A Dayan (the singular form of "Dayanim") literally means "judge" in Hebrew. 192 The Dayanim possess formal qualifications in Jewish law required from recognised Orthodox institutions. 193 See further below. They may seek opinions from other Batei Din (mainly in Israel). 194 See below for a discussion of the presence of witnesses as part of the get process.
R (on the application of E) v JFS Governing Body
The Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque
The The Shariah Council meets monthly, usually for about three to four hours at a time.
Each case takes around five to six minutes since the preliminary work of testing whether the marriage is saveable has been done by the Family Support Service. They also give advice to the parties if there is anything which they notice that the parties should have taken into 195 The Council of Management is elected every year and any major changes require the consent or sanction of the Council of Management. Wales. The main motivation for forming the National Tribunal for Wales was the desirability of pooling personnel. Since the Decree of Erection does not stipulate that the tribunal is a marriage tribunal, it could therefore possibly have a wider scope. Conventionally the diocesan court exercises the Bishop"s judicial powers on his behalf. 199 However, in practice, all of the National Tribunal"s work has concerned its marriage jurisdiction.
The Archbishop of Cardiff is the Moderator of the National Tribunal. The tribunal is headed by the Judicial Vicar who is responsible for assigning the work and supervising the running 198 Other Councils may come back to the original Council to verify any evidence and the Council"s original decisions. 199 This means that the Tribunal could determine a number of rights and duties under canon law. This could include status disputes between parishioners and their priests and other parochial disputes. However, in practice these tend to be resolved parochially. The same is true of disputes concerning finances and "temporal goods".
(Here there is a tension between canon law and the law of England and Wales: whereas under canon law, the parish owns its own property, under charity law, the diocese is the owner.) The Tribunal could also determine disputes arising in church schools concerning the religious character of the school. The Tribunal would have no role in relation to admissions. Canon law also prescribes a recommended system of penalties for crimes. This means that the tribunal could be involved in imposing penalties for matters such as child abuse. The tribunal could impose these penalties unless the crime involved a Bishop in which case it would be dealt with by Rome.
pastoral means should be tried to resolve a situation, 208 pastoral care is left to the parish clergy. This is largely because the Tribunal will not grant an annulment unless the parties have been divorced in civil law. If the tribunal finds that the marriage is void then the case 209 is automatically passed for review to the tribunal of second instance which, in the case of Wales, is Birmingham.
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Their Jurisdiction in respect of Marriage and Divorce
This section provides a general outline of the jurisdiction each of the institutions has in relation to marriage and divorce, with particular reference to the process followed and the type of termination provided.
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The Beth Din in London
The Beth Din may occasionally, but rarely, rule on validity, but primarily deals with divorces.
Its role is supervisory. The role of the Beth Din is to ensure that the parties divorce each other correctly and that the get document itself is properly drawn up. Except very rarely, the Beth Din does not judge or declare the marriage to be terminated. Usually there is no "ruling" or judgment that the marriage has broken down, because, as with a marriage, the parties make or end the contract themselves. The function of the Beth Din is simply to witness the parties" mutual divorce and ensure, for the purposes of future remarriage and the status of future offspring of the parties within the religion, that the writing of the get document which signifies the divorce, and the procedure of handing it from the husband (or his representative)
to the wife, is conducted correctly.
212
A Decree Absolute under civil law is required before the get certificate is issued, though the get process itself can be completed before. The position is slightly complicated because of the provision under civil divorce law to delay the pronouncement of the decree absolute in 208 Canon 1676 provides that: "Before he accepts a case and whenever there appears to be hope of success, the judge is to use pastoral means to persuade the spouses that, if it is possible, they should perhaps validate their marriage and resume their conjugal life". 209 The Case File will contain any dissenting opinions by the judges at first instance. 210 The 2 nd instance judges will not add their arguments to the case file but will issue a decree of ratification (or non-ratification) for the decree of nullity issued by the tribunal of first instance. Competence to act as a tribunal of second instance is granted by Rome. 211 The following does not go into the substantive details of the rules of the different religious faiths for terminating the marriage or declaring it void. to write and sign the get. The get is then written. 216 The Dayan checks that the process has been fulfilled correctly and then the husband, or his representative (again appointed by the Beth Din), hands the get to the wife declaring that she is divorced from the husband. These proceedings are not held in public. 217 The fee is £695 or £495 for members of the United Synagogue.
The Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque
Over half of the cases dealt with by the Shariah Council that we studied involved couples who were not married under English civil law. The Council must be satisfied there are valid grounds for declaring the marriage over, based on evidence submitted by the applicant and in light of any conflicting evidence from the other spouse.
Given that the husband may unilaterally divorce his wife under Islamic law, it is not surprising that applicants are almost always wives. For the Shariah Council that we studied, 213 Enacted by the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 and now contained in s 10A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 214 The Beth Din interviewees were keen not to see them as proceedings on the basis that fault is not being attributed. 215 The "witnesses" are not witnesses to what has gone wrong with the marriage in the way that they would be in the other tribunals, but witnesses to the giving and receiving of the get. 216 The scribe writes the Get by hand which takes between one and two hours to do. After this time, the parties return to the room and are given the Get. 217 The parties do not have to meet each other, but the Beth Din may appoint a representative for the husband, who hands the get to him, and he then -possibly several weeks later -hands it to the wife.
the focus effectively is on determining whether the marriage is no longer workable and, as we have seen, there is a mandatory mediation stage prior to a ruling being given to see if the marriage can be saved. In essence, the Council looks to see if the marriage can be terminated by means of a talaq or khul (that is, by getting the husband to divorce the wife, or to agree to her divorcing him) and if not, it will then look for grounds to fit the circumstances of the case. Proof that the marriage is not workable any more is based on grounds which may include fault factors. Where a civil divorce has been obtained, this in itself will be taken as proof of irretrievable breakdown and as obviating the need for a religious divorce to be 
The National Tribunal for Wales in Cardiff
The Roman Catholic Church may issue "dispensations", "dissolutions" and "annulments". The focus of this commentary is on the last of these, as the National Tribunal is directly 218 Where the applicant has had a civil divorce then only one letter will go to the other party as a courtesy.
Where there has not been a civil divorce (usually because the marriage was not registered under civil law), the three letters are sent out by recorded delivery to try to ensure that the person has received notice of the proceedings. 219 Not all cases go to the Shariah Council, as sometimes people just go to the family support service for advice.
concerned only with annulments. Its approach is inquisitorial: the Tribunal must be satisfied there are grounds to annul the marriage. In essence, the Tribunal is concerned with whether there was a true consent between the parties at the time of the marriage. This may be established by evidence relating to incapacity 220 and several other grounds. 221 The National
Tribunal will not deal with an application for annulment until the civil divorce has been obtained.
The process falls into four stages. First, the applicant will approach his or her parish priest for advice (and at this stage the priest will typically explore the scope for reconciliation). The opinions that have been produced to reach its verdict, which it does in private without the parties being there. The fee is £450 but may be reduced on a discretionary basis. 220 For example, consanguinity, age, prior marriage, lack of mental capacity. 221 Including evidence that the person suffers "from a grave lack of discretionary judgement concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted" (Canon 1095.1.2), or "who, because of causes of a psychological nature, [is] unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" (Canon 1095.1.3). It is also interesting to note the concept of "simulation", set out in Canon 1096.1: "For matrimonial consent to exist, it is necessary that the contracting parties be at least not ignorant of the fact that marriage is a permanent partnership between a man and a woman, ordered to the procreation of children through some form of sexual cooperation". 222 A priest nominated to carry out the task. 223 The interview with the instructing judge or auditor is the only direct contact the applicant will have with the panel . Even where an Advocate is appointed, he does not interview the petitioner but comments on the case that he or she has put forward.
Introduction
This part sets out the key findings from the project. The three case studies should not be considered to be "typical" or "representative" of Jewish, Christian or Islamic tribunals in general. Moreover, since our empirical investigation consisted mainly of interviews with tribunal personnel, it is important to note that the data collected derives from the perspective of the tribunal rather than of the users. 225 The focus of the project was to compare the work of tribunals of different religions and how they relate to the law of the State.
The findings are organised in three sections. The first examines the organisation and operation of the tribunals in the study. The second part examines their jurisdiction in relation to marriage, nullity and divorce. The third and final section reflects upon the relationship between the tribunals and societal/civil law expectations.
The Tribunals, their Structure and Sources of Authority
Diversity within Faiths
There is no monolithic community representing the entire body within any of the three faiths This is more likely in the Muslim community, by virtue of the lack of any structural linkages between mosques according to the religious school of thought that they follow. For Jewish people, the rulings handed down by the more liberal wings of Judaism would not be recognised in the orthodox communities, so those who belong to such wings might still choose to make use of a more orthodox Beth Din in order to secure broader recognition.
The Catholic Tribunal is in a different position being part of a hierarchical appeal structure which derives its authority from Rome. However, there is still an element of "choice" here in the form of choosing whether to pursue a remedy through the Tribunal. Indeed, it would appear that the parish priest may exercise a significant role in advising whether individuals ought to go to the Tribunal.
Flexibility in use of Sources of Law and Authority
Each religious tribunal applies a body of religious "law" in the sense of a set of norms that are binding on adherents. However, the particular Shariah Council studied in this project appears to take a very flexible approach. It told us that it did not represent any single school of thought but rather drew on different schools of thought to arrive at what it regards as just and fair decisions. There is no system of "precedent" which constrains its decision-making.
This is also true of the Beth Din, which will look to a range of opinions and rulings from other batei din in reaching its judgments but again, as there is no hierarchy of tribunals, it is not bound by any prior ruling. However, the particular role that the Beth Din plays in relation to divorce limits the scope for variation in any event, since Jewish divorce law as interpreted by this Beth Din is focused squarely on witnessing the parties" consent to divorce and is not governed by "grounds".
The Catholic Tribunal draws on commentaries as well as the Code of Canon Law and regards its own decisions and rulings from Rome as persuasive but not binding. This flexibility as to sources of law is common to all of the institutions we studied. The autonomous position of the particular tribunal, and/or the breadth of the rules which might be applied to the case before it, provides a degree of flexibility to the decision-maker. The institutions we studied seem to be using religious law in practical ways to meet real needs.
Interaction of Religious and Legal Roles
A commonality between all the Tribunals in relation to staffing is the degree to which their operation rests upon volunteers and the services of those who usually have other professional religious roles within their communities. There is clearly a fusion of religious and legal roles.
Personnel in all three tribunals are seen as sources of guidance and advice outside the judicial process. Their authority may derive from their position in the tribunal, their standing in the community or their own personality.
None of the tribunals studied has a "legal status" in the sense of "recognition" by the state.
They derive their authority from their religious affiliation, not from the state, and that authority extends only to those who choose to submit to them. However, as far as marriage/divorce is concerned, they are not "arbitrators". Their authority to rule on the validity/termination of a marriage does not derive from the parties" agreement to submit their "dispute" to them (indeed, there may be no dispute) in the same way as an arbitration clause in a contract (for which the Beth Din and some Shariah tribunals would also qualify to rule on civil disputes). Rather, adherents to the particular faith must make use of the religious tribunal if they are to obtain sanction to remarry within their faith.
Marriage, Annulment and Divorce
Grounds for Termination
All three religions see marriage as based fundamentally on the volition of the parties. For
Muslims and Jews, marriage is therefore a contract, to be ended at the parties" will. For
Catholics, marriage is a sacrament as well as a contract, but the focus on a true consent as the basis for annulment reflects the same understanding of the essence of marriage as the other faiths.
The basis for the ending of the marriage varies as between the three tribunals. For the Shariah Council, the focus is on determining whether the marriage is no longer workable, and there is a mandatory mediation stage prior to a ruling being given to see if the marriage can be saved.
It could be said that the Shariah Council has a view of the process closest to the basis of current English divorce law as both focus on whether the marriage has "irretrievably broken down".
For the Beth Din, no grounds need be proved, and there is no "ruling" or judgment that the marriage has broken down. The function of the Beth Din is (in almost all cases) simply to witness the parties" mutual divorce and ensure, for the purposes of future remarriage and the status of future offspring of the parties within the religion, that the writing of the get document which signifies the divorce, and the procedure of handing it from husband to wife, are conducted correctly.
For the National Tribunal, the grounds for annulment are related to whether there was a true consent between the parties, which may be established by evidence drawn from events during the marriage itself. In this regard, some of the grounds come closer to what English law would see as voidable, rather than void, marriages, or even facts which would present as establishing irretrievable breakdown for the purposes of divorce.
A Licence to Remarry
The fundamental rationale for the grant of the religious annulment/divorce is to enable the parties to remarry within the faith. The focus is on the marriage itself, not the ancillaries (children, money and property) and reminds us that ultimately, a dissolution or annulment is a licence to remarry. For adherents, being able to remarry within the faith serves both to enable them to remain within their faith community and to regularise their position with the religious authorities. This is particularly crucial in the Jewish religion, because the failure to obtain a get will jeopardise the legitimate status of the wife"s future children and descendants.
the role that each takes. For the Beth Din, there is no investigation by the tribunal into the parties" reasons for seeking a get. If there appears to be a possibility that the parties are not sure that they wish to divorce, they will be encouraged to seek counselling, but this is not part of the tribunal"s function itself. Rather, the function is to supervise and witness the parties"
mutual agreement that the marriage should end.
For the Shariah Council, a mediation stage is a mandatory preliminary step in the process. This is not mediation in the sense now understood in the English family justice system, which focuses on encouraging the parties to reach agreement on the consequences of the divorce.
Rather, the focus is actually on reconciliation. If the applicant still wishes to proceed after mediation, the role of the Council is to ensure the marriage is unworkable and it will listen to the parties" evidence, and hear their witnesses, to arrive at its decision. The process at this stage is primarily adversarial in that the Council is in the hands of the parties as to what information is put forward to it and how arguments are presented.
The National Tribunal adopts a more proactive and inquisitorial approach in the sense that there are different individuals appointed within the process to investigate the marriage from different perspectives -in particular, the "Defender of the Bond" explores the potential for upholding the validity of the marriage and the tribunal may seek evidence from its own witnesses, including independent experts.
None of the tribunals operates the kind of hearing common in the English civil courts (although not in the divorce court where most divorces are undefended and handled without any oral hearing) whereby both parties hear and may cross-examine on the evidence brought by the other. For the Beth Din, this is not applicable given the nature of the get process. For the National Tribunal and the Shariah Council, the parties are seen separately, although in the case of the Shariah Council, they might both be physically present on the same day for the Council to deal with their case.
All three religious tribunals are clearly aware of the emotional dimension to the process of ending a marriage and seek to recognise this by their procedures. Indeed, it might be argued that keeping the parties apart rather than hearing them at the same time is a way of doing this by reducing the potential for hurtful exchanges. While the Beth Din process is formal and bound by the rules regarding the writing of the get and its handing over, it provides "helpers"
to support women, and the handing over may be done by a representative rather than the husband in person. The Shariah Council appears to adopt a very informal atmosphere. The
Catholic Tribunal, while bound by the canons, keeps the taking of evidence relatively informal by holding interviews with the parties and witnesses in their own localities and again, avoiding a "hearing". All three religious tribunals also recognise an important pastoral role in the process, either through informal advice and counselling or by encouraging parties to consult outside bodies or their own priest/rabbi/imam.
Limited Role in Relation to the 'Ancillaries'
"Ancillary" matters are those relating to the consequences of the ending of the marriage in relation to arrangements for the parties" children, or money and property. The National
Tribunal has no role in relation to dealing with such consequences. Under Jewish law, it is possible for the parties to agree at the time of the marriage a) that they will agree to a get and b) that they will ask the Beth Din to resolve any ancillary disputes. 
The Relationship between the Tribunals and Societal/Civil Law Expectations
Interaction between Civil and Religious Law
Each of the institutions firmly recognises and supports the ultimate authority of civil law processes when it comes to marriage and divorce. All three institutions encourage the parties to obtain a civil divorce, if applicable, before seeking a religious termination. Indeed, the Catholic Tribunal does not deal with an application for annulment until this has been done, and the Beth Din will not provide the certificate that a get has been given until it has proof of the civil divorce. Both the Beth Din and the Shariah Council regard the obtaining of a civil divorce as clear evidence of the parties" view that the marriage is over, and for the Shariah Council, this is conclusive, such that it does not deem it necessary to grant a religious divorce to enable the parties to remarry under Islamic law (although it will do so to reflect the parties"
wishes for "recognition" by the Council of the ending of their marriage).
The Beth Din considers that if the husband will not agree to a divorce, then under Jewish law, it has no means to compel him to do so. In such a case, the wife is known as a "chained wife", None of the tribunals has any legal status afforded to them by the state or the civil law, and their rulings and determinations in relation to marital status have no civil recognition either.
They derive their authority from their religious affiliation, not from the state, and that authority extends only to those who choose to submit to them.
Providing a Service for the Faith Community
All of the institutions studied see their work as a religious duty. They regard themselves as providing important mechanisms for the organisation of community affairs and the fulfilment of community need. The structural framework, organisation, resourcing, and staffing of each of the tribunals in many ways reflect the history, economic resources, and social development of the communities they serve. The Beth Din, Shariah Council and Catholic Tribunal, provide an important service for those Jews, Muslims and Catholics for whom a religious divorce "in the sight of God" is important from both a spiritual and religious legal perspective.
